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Current Circuit Splits 
The following pages contain brief summaries, drafted by the 
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, of circuit splits identified by 
federal court of appeals opinions between October 2009 and March 
2010. This collection is organized by civil and criminal matters, then by 
subject matter. 
Each summary briefly describes a current circuit split. It is intended 
to give only the briefest synopsis of the circuit split, not a comprehensive 
analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be exhaustive, but will 
hopefully serve the reader well as a reference starting point. 
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CIVIL MATTERS 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
False Claims Act (“FCA”) – Public Disclosure Jurisdictional Bar: U.S. 
ex rel. Ondis v. Woonsocket, 587 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2009) 
The 1st Circuit addressed the meaning of the phrase “based upon” 
as used in the public disclosure jurisdictional bar to putative qui tam 
actions brought under the FCA. Id. at 53, 57. The court noted that under 
the FCA, one of the prongs for determining if the qui tam action is barred 
relies on whether the relator’s suit is “based upon” publicly disclosed 
allegations or transactions. Id. at 53. The court noted that the 2nd, 3rd, 
7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th and D.C. Circuits determined that “as long as the 
relator’s allegations are substantially similar to information disclosed 
publicly, the relator’s claim is ‘based upon’ the public disclosure even if 
he actually obtained his information from a different source,” while the 
4th Circuit alone requires “proof that the relator’s allegations are actually 
derived from the publicly disclosed information.” Id. at 57. The 1st 
Circuit agreed with the 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th and D.C. 
Circuits in finding that a broader reading of the phrase “based upon” 
comports with the overall structure and purpose of the FCA to preclude 
“qui tam actions that merely parrot previously disclosed allegations or 
transactions.” Id. at 58. The court disagreed with the 4th Circuit’s 
position that “a relator’s allegations actually must be derived from a 
public disclosure in order to trigger the jurisdictional bar,” because under 
such an interpretation, the “original source” exception would be read out 
of the statute. Id. Thus the 1st Circuit concluded that the “based upon” 
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requirement is satisfied “when the relator’s allegations are substantially 
similar to allegations or transactions already in the public domain at the 
time he brings his qui tam action.” Id. 
BANKRUPTCY LAW 
Automatic Stay Violations – Attorneys Fees: Sternberg v. Johnston, 582 
F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2009)  
The 9th Circuit addressed whether damages for an attorney’s 
violation of his affirmative duty to educate a state court on the extent of a 
bankruptcy stay can include attorney’s fees incurred in prosecuting the 
action against the violating party. Id. at 1116. The court recognized that 
the 5th Circuit—the only court of appeals to have previously addressed 
the issue—concluded that “it is proper to award attorney’s fees that were 
incurred prosecuting [the claim].”  Id. at 1124. However, the 9th Circuit 
found this language unpersuasive, and instead held that “only those 
attorney fees related to enforcing the automatic stay and remedying the 
stay violation, not the fees incurred in prosecuting the bankruptcy 
adversary proceeding in which he pursued his claim for those damages,” 
are recoverable. Id. at 1116. 
Standard of Review – Equitable Mootness: Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v. 
Jubber (In re Paige), 584 F.3d 1327 (10th Cir. 2009) 
The 10th Circuit addressed “whether a district court’s ultimate 
determination of equitable mootness should be reviewed de novo or for 
abuse of discretion.” Id. at 1334–35. The court noted that the 5th, 6th, 
and 11th Circuits have reviewed the determination of equitable mootness 
de novo, while the 3rd Circuit created a split by opting to review these 
determinations for abuse of discretion. Id. at 1335. The 10th Circuit 
expressed the view that the split was “likely [due to] the unique role of 
the district courts in the bankruptcy context.” Id. The position of the 
majority of the circuits is that the district court acts as an appellate court 
in a bankruptcy case and therefore the appellate court must review the 
decision de novo based on legal determinations. Id. Alternatively, the 3rd 
Circuit previously held that a determination of equitable mootness is 
discretionary and must be granted some deference. Id. The 10th Circuit 
noted that it has already adopted the abuse-of-discretion standard “in the 
similar context of prudential mootness.” Id. Therefore, the 10th Circuit 
agreed with the 3rd Circuit and “adopt[ed] the abuse-of-discretion 
336 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 6:331 
 
standard of review for determinations of equitable mootness in 
bankruptcy cases.” Id. 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Competency to Stand Trial – Burden of Proof: United States v. 
Whittington, 586 F.3d 613 (7th Cir. 2009) 
The 7th Circuit addressed “which party has the burden of proof at a 
competency hearing” under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d).  Id. at 617. The court 
noted that the 4th and 10th Circuits placed the burden of proof on the 
defendant to prove incompetence, while the 3rd, 5th, 7th and 9th Circuits 
placed the burden on the government to prove competence. The 11th 
Circuit placed the burden with the party moving to determine 
competency, and the 2nd Circuit declined to address the issue because 
“[t]he allocation of the burden of proof to the defendant will affect 
competency determinations only in a narrow class of cases where the 
evidence is in equipoise.” Id. at 618. The 7th Circuit agreed with the 4th 
and 10th Circuits in finding that the burden should be placed on the 
defendant. Id. The court disagreed with the 3rd, 5th, 7th and 9th Circuits 
and found the decisions of those courts “inconsistent with Supreme Court 
precedent that holds the accused in a federal prosecution must prove 
incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. Thus the 7th 
Circuit concluded that the defendant has the burden of proof at a 
competency hearing. Id. 
Jurisdiction – Forum Selection Clause: Wong v. Partygaming Ltd., 589 
F.3d 821 (6th Cir. 2009) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether state or federal law governs the 
inquiry into the enforceability of a forum selection clause when a federal 
court exercises diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 826. The court noted that a 
majority of circuits have determined that “the enforceability of a forum 
selection clause implicates federal procedure and should therefore be 
governed by federal law,” while the 7th and 10th Circuits found that the 
law that governs the contract as a whole also governs the enforceability 
of the forum selection clause. Id. at 827. The 6th Circuit agreed with the 
majority of circuits in finding “forum selection clauses significantly 
implicate federal procedure issues. Id. Thus the 6th Circuit concluded 
that federal law governs the enforceability of a forum selection clause 
when a federal court exercises diversity jurisdiction.  Id. at 828. 
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Remedies – Attorneys’ Fees: Fox v. Vice, 594 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2010) 
The 5th Circuit addressed whether a defendant has to prevail over 
an entire suit in order to recover attorneys’ fees for frivolous 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 claims. Id. at 428. The court noted that the majority of circuits hold 
that a defendant does not have to prevail over an entire suit to recover 
attorneys’ fees. Id. The 5th Circuit agreed with the 9th and 11th Circuits 
that “it would undermine the intent of Congress to allow plaintiffs to 
prosecute frivolous claims without consequences merely because those 
claims were joined with additional non-frivolous claims.” Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The 5th Circuit stated that “[s]uch a rule 
would also make a defendant’s entitlement to attorneys’ fees ‘depend not 
upon the district court’s review of the merits of a plaintiff’s § 1983 
claims, but upon how a plaintiff chose to draft his complaint.” Id. at 428–
29. Thus the 5th Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion when awarding defendant attorney’s fees even though 
defendant did not prevail on the entire suit. Id. at 429. 
Removal –Timely Filing: Barbour v. Int’l Union, 594 F.3d 315 (4th Cir. 
2010) 
The 4th Circuit addressed how to calculate timely filing for removal 
when multiple defendants were served at different times and one or more 
of the defendants were served outside the original 30-day period required 
by 28 U.S.C. 1446(b). Id. at 319. The court noted the 5th Circuit’s “first-
served defendant rule,” under which the “[30-day] period begins to run 
as soon as the first defendant is served.” Id. The court also noted the 
“last-served defendant rule” favored by the 6th, 8th, and 11th Circuits, 
which “permits each defendant, upon formal service of process, thirty 
days to file a notice of removal.” Id. at 319–20. The court also discussed 
the “middle ground rule,” a position that a 4th Circuit panel had 
expressed. Id. at 320. The “middle ground rule” would have allowed 
later-served defendants who filed within 30 days of being served to join a 
valid removal petition, but would have prevented those defendants from 
filing for removal if the earlier-served defendants had not filed within the 
statutory period or had filed defective petitions. Id. Because the “middle 
ground rule” was not essential to the 4th Circuit’s previous decision, the 
court reasoned that it was not bound to follow the middle-ground rule. Id. 
at 321–22. The 4th Circuit disagreed with the middle ground and first-
served defendant rules because “[u]nder either . . . rule, [the later-served 
defendant]’s right of removal would have been waived by the [first-
served defendant]’s failure to file a notice of removal within 30 days of 
being served even though it was not yet within the court’s jurisdiction.” 
338 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 6:331 
 
Id. at 324. “Such prejudice . . . would violate the spirit, if not the letter, 
of the ‘bedrock principle’ that ‘a defendant is not obliged to engage in 
litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s 
authority, by formal process.’” Id. Thus, the 4th Circuit concluded “in 
cases involving multiple defendants, each defendant, once served with 
formal process, has 30 days to file a notice of removal pursuant to § 28 
U.S.C. 1446(b) in which earlier-served defendants may join regardless of 
whether they have previously filed a notice of removal.” Id. at 326. 
Social Security Act – Attorney Fees: Walker v. Astrue, 593 F.3d 274 (3d 
Cir. 2010) 
The 3rd Circuit addressed “what filing deadline under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure governs a petition for attorney fees under 
Section 406(b) of the Social Security Act when a case is remanded under 
sentence four of Section 405(g) for a determination of benefits[.]” Id. at 
276. The court noted that the 5th and 11th Circuits have held that Rule 
54(d)(2)’s 14-day filing deadline applies, while the 10th Circuit has held 
that the “reasonable time” standard under Rule 60(b) applies. Id. The 3rd 
Circuit agreed with the 5th and 11th Circuits in finding that Rule 
54(d)(2) is the appropriate standard. Id. The court disagreed with the 
10th Circuit’s approach because the use of the “reasonable time” 
standard “finds little support in the law,” as the 10th Circuit relied on the 
7th Circuit’s reading of Rule 54 prior to its 1993 amendment, “which 
contained no time limit for filing and which courts interpreted to contain 
‘an implicit requirement of reasonableness.’” Id. at 279. Thus, the 3rd 
Circuit concluded that “Rule 54(d)(2) is the appropriate avenue through 
which counsel can seek attorney fees following a § 406(b) administrative 
remand.” Id. at 280. The 3rd Circuit further held that “the application of 
the filing deadline is tolled until the notice of award is issued by the 
Commissioner and counsel is notified of that award.” Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Exclusionary Rule — Retroactivity of Constitutional Decision: United 
States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2010) 
The 11th Circuit reviewed an exclusionary rule case in light of the 
Supreme Court decision in Arizona v. Gant, 552 U.S. 1230 (2008), which 
was rendered during the pendency of the appeal. Id. at 1261. That 
decision broadened the scope of the exclusionary rule by limiting a 
search of a vehicle incident to an arrest to situations where “the arrestee 
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is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of 
the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of 
the offense of arrest.” Id. at 1262. The circuits are split regarding the 
“retroactivity of a constitutional decision.” Id. The 5th and 10th Circuits 
do not apply the exclusionary rule retroactively, in opposition to the 9th 
Circuit. Id. at 1264. The 11th Circuit sided with the 5th and 10th 
Circuits, holding that although the defendant was subject to an illegal 
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, it would not “tie the 
retroactivity of new Fourth Amendment rules to the suppression of 
evidence.” Id. at 1265. The 11th Circuit explained that “[b]ecause the 
exclusionary rule is justified solely by its potential to deter police 
misconduct, suppressing evidence obtained from an unlawful search is 
inappropriate when the offending officer reasonably relie[s] on well-
settled precedent.” Id. at 1266. The 11th Circuit concluded that “the 
good-faith exception [which] allows the use of evidence obtained in 
reasonable reliance on well-settled precedent” was applicable in refusing 
to retroactively apply the new Fourth Amendment rules. Id. at 1268. 
McCarran-Ferguson Act (“MFA”) – Pre-emption of State Law: Safety 
Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London, 587 F.3d 
714 (5th Cir. 2009) 
The 5th Circuit addressed the issue of whether implemented treaty 
provisions are reverse-preempted by state law under the MFA. Id. at 731. 
The court noted that the 2nd Circuit determined that when a treaty is not 
self-executing and thus relies on an act of Congress for implementation, 
the implementing legislation is reverse-preempted by state law under the 
MFA. Id. The 5th Circuit agreed that when the provisions of a treaty are 
not self-executing, enforcement of the provisions in a United States court 
depends on implementation by Congress. Id. However, the 5th Circuit 
disagreed with the holding of the 2nd Circuit and found that the “Act of 
Congress” referred to in the MFA cannot be seen as distinguishing 
between treaties that require implementation by Congress and those that 
do not. Id. Thus, the 5th Circuit held that implemented treaty provisions, 
self-executing or not, are not reverse–preempted by state law pursuant to 
the MFA. Id. 
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EMPLOYMENT LAW 
Long Term Disability Plans – Material Duties: Darvell v. Life Ins. Co. 
of N. Am., 597 F.3d 929 (8th Cir. 2010) 
The 8th Circuit addressed whether the “phrase ‘material duties of 
his . . . regular occupation’ [under a disability plan] can be interpreted as 
referring to the duties that are commonly performed by those who hold 
the same occupation as defined by the DOT (a ‘generic’ approach), or 
the duties that the specific claimant actually performed for his employer 
(a ‘claimant-specific’ approach).” Id. at 935. The court noted that the 6th 
Circuit follows the “generic approach,” while the 3rd and 10th Circuits 
follow the “claimant-specific approach.” Id. at 936. The 8th Circuit 
reasoned that “‘[o]ccupation’ is a more general term that seemingly 
refers to categories of work than narrower employment terms like 
‘position,’ ‘job,’ or ‘work,’ which are more related to a particular 
employee’s individual duties.” Id. The 8th Circuit further noted that 
“where plan fiduciaries have offered a ‘reasonable interpretation’ of 
disputed provisions, courts may not replace [it] with an interpretation of 
their own . . . .” Id. at 935. Thus, the 8th Circuit concluded that the 
insurance company’s “interpretation of ‘material duties of his . . . regular 
occupation’ is not contrary to clear language of the [p]lan” and therefore, 
the disability plan can be interpreted under the “generic approach.” Id. at 
936. 
Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) – Evidence Necessary to 
Establish Incapacity: Schaar v. Lehigh Valley Health Servs., 598 F.3d 
156 (3d Cir. 2010) 
The 3rd Circuit addressed “whether a combination of expert and lay 
testimony can establish that an employee was incapacitated for more than 
three days as required by the FMLA’s implementing regulations” in 
order to establish the statute’s requisite serious medical condition. Id. at 
157. The court noted that the 5th and 9th Circuits found lay testimony 
alone sufficient to establish incapacitation under the FMLA, while the 
8th Circuit held that lay testimony could only be used “to supplement 
incomplete medical evidence.” Id. at 160. The court looked to the 
Department of Labor regulations, which do not require a health care 
professional to make the determination of incapacity, and stated that lay 
testimony should therefore not be categorically excluded when making 
an incapacity determination. Id. at 161. However, the court disagreed 
with the 5th and 9th Circuits, finding that some medical testimony is 
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necessary to establish causation between the incapacitation and the 
serious health condition, so that employers are not faced with a heavy 
burden to “inquire into an employee’s eligibility for FMLA leave based 
solely on the employee’s self–diagnosed illness.” Id. Thus, the 3rd 
Circuit held that “an employee may satisfy her burden of proving three 
days of incapacitation through a combination of expert medical and lay 
testimony.” Id. 
Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) – Front Pay: Traxler v. 
Multnomah County, 596 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2010) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether “the court, rather than the jury, 
determines the amount of the front pay award” under the FMLA. Id. at 
1009. The court noted that the 4th, 5th, and 10th Circuits have agreed 
that “the approach in these cases follows the general recognition that 
front pay is best understood as a substitute for the equitable remedy of 
reinstatement, and thus, is appropriately determined by the court.” Id. at 
1011. The court also noted that the 6th Circuit “[d]iffers [by] holding that 
the district court determines the propriety of awarding front pay, but that 
the jury decides the actual amount of the award.” Id. The 9th Circuit 
agreed with the 4th, 5th, and 10th Circuits in finding that an award of 
front pay is “an alternative to reinstatement [and] is derived solely from 
the statutory provision permitting the court to award ‘such equitable 
relief as may be appropriate.’” Id. at 1011–12. The court disagreed with 
the 6th Circuit as the statute does not support splitting “the availability of 
front pay . . . [as] a judicial determination and the amount a jury 
determination.” Id. at 1012. Thus, the 9th Circuit concluded “[t]hat under 
the FMLA, front pay is an equitable remedy that must be determined by 
the court, both as to the availability of the remedy and the amount of any 
award.” Id. at 1011. 
Rehabilitation Act – Independent Contractor: Fleming v. Yuma Reg’l 
Med. Ctr., 587 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2009) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether § 504(d) of the Rehabilitation 
Act, “which refers to ‘the standards applied under title I of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act [ADA]. . . as such sections relate to 
employment,’ incorporates Title I literally or selectively.” Id. at 939. The 
9th Circuit needed to resolve this question in order to determine the 
primary issue of whether § 504 extends to a “claim of discrimination 
brought by an independent contractor.” Id. at 939. The court noted that 
“if Title I is incorporated literally, then the Rehabilitation Act is limited 
by the ADA and only covers employer-employee relationships in the 
342 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 6:331 
 
workplace.” Id. However, as the court pointed out, if Title I is 
incorporated selectively, “the Rehabilitation Act covers all individuals 
‘subject to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance,’ who may bring an employment 
discrimination claim based on the standards found in the ADA.” Id. The 
court noted that the 6th and 8th Circuits determined that Title I of the 
ADA is incorporated literally, while the 10th Circuit found Title I to be 
incorporated selectively. Id. The 9th Circuit agreed with the 10th Circuit 
in finding that while § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act “incorporates the 
‘standards’ of Title I of the ADA for proving when discrimination in the 
workplace is actionable,” it does not incorporate Title I in totality. Id. 
The court disagreed with the 8th Circuit’s position that the “similarity” 
between Title I and the Rehabilitation Act leads to the conclusion that 
both statutes apply to “employer-employee” relationships, and therefore 
do not extend coverage to independent contractors. Id. at 946. Although 
reluctant to state that 6th Circuit precedent bore directly on the issue, the 
9th Circuit disagreed with the 6th Circuit’s conclusion that the ADA and 
Rehabilitation Act “borrowed” the definition of “employer” from Title 
VII of the ADA. Id. Thus the 9th Circuit concluded that § 504 
“incorporates the ‘standards’ of Title I of the ADA for proving when 
discrimination in the workplace is actionable, but not Title I in toto, and 
therefore the Rehabilitation Act covers discrimination claims by an 
independent contractor.” Id. at 939. 
IMMIGRATION 
Good Faith Marriage Waiver – Jurisdiction: Contreras-Salinas v. 
Holder, 585 F.3d 710 (2d Cir. 2009) 
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether the court had jurisdiction to 
review the discretionary decision of the Attorney General to grant or 
deny a waiver under 8 U.S.C. §1186a(c)(4), which requires an alien to 
file a “good faith marriage waiver” to remain in the country post divorce 
from a United States citizen. Id. at 713. The court noted that the 9th 
Circuit determined that “despite the clear language committing 
credibility determinations to the ‘sole discretion of the Attorney 
General,’ . . . courts nevertheless retain jurisdiction to review such 
determinations.” Id. at n.4. Further, the 9th Circuit “relied on the 
legislative history . . . [and] concluded that the statutory history 
demonstrates beyond any question that Congress adopted this language 
for the specific purpose of putting a stop to immigration officials’ 
practice of employing overly-strict evidentiary rules when determining 
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the credibility of battered women, and not in order to limit judicial 
review of credibility decisions.” Id. (emphasis in original). Here, the 2nd 
Circuit disagreed with the 9th Circuit, finding that by the statutory 
language “Congress . . . demonstrates an unambiguous intent to limit 
judicial review.” Id. Thus, the 2nd Circuit concluded that it lacked 
jurisdiction to review petitioner’s challenges to the credibility and weight 
of the findings by the Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration 
Appeals and held that such discretion is left solely to the Attorney 
General. Id. 
Repeal of Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) – Reliance: Canto 
v. Holder, 593 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010). 
The 7th Circuit considered “whether th[e] petitioners who opted to 
go to trial ‘relied’ on the continued existence of equitable relief under 
section 212(c) in foregoing [their] legal right” to an appeal. Id. at 643. 
The court noted that the 4th and 11th Circuits require actual reliance, 
requiring a petitioner to “show that he actually subjectively relied on the 
prior law in the criminal proceedings resulting in his conviction.” Id. On 
the other hand, the court pointed out that the 3rd, 8th, and 10th Circuits 
have utilized an objective reliance standard, by which a petitioner merely 
needs to “establish that relevant circumstances gave rise to interests upon 
which it would have been objectively reasonable for a petitioner to rely 
on the prior law in deciding to give up a legal right.” Id. Additionally, the 
court noted that the 1st and 9th Circuits made no distinction between 
these two forms of reliance and “have categorically held that petitioners 
who chose to go to trial could not possibly have relied on the continued 
existence of section 212(c) relief.” Id. The court stated that it has 
previously agreed with the 1st and 9th Circuits “holding that relief under 
former section 212(c) only remains open to: (1) petitioners who pled 
guilty prior to section 212(c)’s repeal; or (2) ‘aliens who conceded 
deportability before AEDPA’s enactment, with the expectation that they 
could seek waivers under § 212(c).’” Id. at 643–44. However, the court 
noted that the instant case presented “a slightly more nuanced argument . 
. . that [petitioner] forwent his legal right to appeal his conviction in 
reliance on his continued ability to seek section 212(c) relief.” Id. at 644. 
The 7th Circuit pointed out that, with the exception of the 4th Circuit, 
“the circuits are generally in agreement that the Supreme Court prefers a 
categorical approach over an individualized analysis when deciding 
whether an alien relied on the continued existence of section 212(c) in 
forgoing a legal right.” Id. As such, the court stated that it also has 
“followed the categorical approach, finding that the category of aliens 
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who went to trial did not forgo any possible benefit in reliance on section 
212(c),” a category which also “necessarily includes those aliens that 
went to trial, but chose not to appeal.” Id. Thus, the 7th Circuit held that 
it is “more likely than not that the existence of section 212(c) [would] not 
affect [the] decision about whether to appeal” a conviction. Id. at 645. 
LABOR LAW 
Defense Base Act (“DBA”) – Court of Initial Review: Serv. Emples. 
Int’l, Inc. v. Dir., 595 F.3d 447 (2d Cir. 2010) 
The 2nd Circuit addressed “whether the initial review of decisions 
of [a DBA] Benefits Review Board . . . lies in the courts of appeals or in 
the district courts.” Id. at 452. In enacting the DBA in 1941, Congress 
“extended the already existing provisions of the Longshore and Harbor 
Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), enacted in 1927, to provide 
workers’ compensation coverage for those engaged in maritime 
employment.” Id. At the time the DBA was enacted, “the LHWCA 
provided for initial review of administrative compensation orders in the 
federal district court for the judicial district in which the injury 
occurred.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Congress later 
amended the LHWCA, “providing for initial review of compensation 
claims in a newly created administrative board (the Benefits Review 
Board) and for judicial review in the courts of appeals,” but Congress 
“made no change in DBA § 3(b), which continued to provide that 
judicial proceedings be conducted in accordance with the LHWCA and 
in the district court.” Id. The 2nd Circuit noted that Congress intended 
that “the DBA track the provisions of the LHWCA” and that the statutes 
should establish a “unified scheme.” Id. at 454. The court further noted 
that the legislative purpose of the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA was 
to “expedit[e] the processing of compensation claims and permit[] 
appeals of agency decisions directly to the courts of appeals without the 
extra step of district court proceedings.” Id. The 2nd Circuit recognized 
that the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 11th Circuits have all held that DBA § 3(b) 
“unambiguously provides that a party adversely affected by the 
administrative resolution of a DBA claim must file a petition for review 
in the United States [D]istrict [C]ourt.” Id. 453 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Nevertheless, the 2nd Circuit disagreed with those circuits and 
joined the 7th and 9th Circuits in holding that § 3b of the DBA “vest[s] 
jurisdiction in the courts of appeals.” Id. 
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PROPERTY LAW 
Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) – Discrimination: Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 
F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) 
The 7th Circuit addressed whether a violation of § 3617 of the FHA 
“can exist without a violation of §3604 or any other FHA provision.” Id. 
at 781. The court noted that the 2nd Circuit and the Southern District of 
Texas determined that § 3617 and § 3601 are co-extensive; therefore, a 
violation of one is a violation of the other. Id. However, the District of 
Nebraska and the Northern District of Illinois held differently. Id. The 
7th Circuit disagreed with the 2nd Circuit, noting that although it had 
held in some instances that the statutes were co-extensive, the present 
case suggested a different construction. Id. The court decided that 
defendants may have “interfered” with plaintiffs’ § 3604 rights, even 
though plaintiffs had not proved a § 3604 violation, thereby suggesting a 
§ 3617 violation without a §3604 violation. Id. The court noted that 
holding otherwise “would make § 3617 entirely duplicative of the other 
FHA provisions.” Id. Thus the 7th Circuit concluded that “a § 3617 claim 
might stand on its own.” Id. at 782. 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 – Adequate Writing: Helcher v. 
Dearborn County, 595 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 2010) 
The 7th Circuit addressed “[w]hat is necessary for an adequate 
writing under the Telecommunications Act.” Id. at 717. The court noted 
that the 1st, 6th, and 9th Circuits determined that the “in writing 
requirement is met so long as the written decision contains a sufficient 
explanation of the reasons for the permit denial to allow a reviewing 
court to evaluate the evidence in the record supporting those reasons.” Id. 
at 718. The 8th Circuit, however, follows an approach “that strike[s] a 
balance between a dubious, literal reading of the Act and a pragmatic, 
policy-based approach.” Id. The 7th Circuit agreed with the 1st, 6th and 
9th Circuits in finding the “primary purpose of the “in writing” 
requirement for the Telecommunications Act is to allow for meaningful 
judicial review of the decisions of local governments. Id. at 719. Thus, 
the 7th Circuit concluded the “in writing [requirement] is adequate if it 
provides an explanation that allows [a court], in combination with the 
written record, to determine if the decision is supported by substantial 
evidence.” Id. 
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Title IX – Notice Requirement: Mansourian v. Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal., 594 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2010) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether “pre-litigation notice and 
opportunity to cure is necessary in cases alleging unequal provision of 
athletic opportunities in violation of Title IX.” Id. at 1105. The court 
noted that the 5th Circuit determined that “the requirement in the sexual 
harassment cases—that the academic institution have actual knowledge 
of the sexual harassment—is not applicable for purposes of determining 
whether an academic institution intentionally discriminated on the basis 
of sex by denying females equal athletic opportunity,” while the 8th 
Circuit found the notice requirement applies without any analysis. Id. at 
1106. The 9th Circuit agreed with the 5th Circuit in finding that “[i]t 
would also be inconsistent with funding recipients affirmative 
obligations to provide nondiscriminatory athletic participation 
opportunities and continually to assess and certify compliance with Title 
IX.” Id. The court disagreed with the 8th Circuit, finding that its 
approach is inconsistent with application of the notice requirement. Id. 
Thus, the 9th Circuit concluded that the “notice requirement is 
inapplicable to cases alleging that a funding recipient has failed 
effectively to accommodate women’s interest in athletics.” 
 
CRIMINAL MATTERS 
SENTENCING 
Aggravating Crime – Hypothetical Felony Approach: United States v. 
Hector Santana-Illan, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 28536 (10th Cir. Dec. 29, 
2009) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether the hypothetical felony 
approach permits a court to examine the crime for which the defendant 
could have been prosecuted or only the crime that was actually 
prosecuted when determining if an aggravating crime occurred. Id. at *7–
8. The court noted that the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Circuits determined that 
the hypothetical felony approach only permits courts to examine the 
crime actually prosecuted, while the 5th and 7th Circuits found that 
courts could base a decision on the crime that could have been 
prosecuted. Id. at *8. The 10th Circuit agreed with the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 
6th Circuits in finding that the inclusion of the word “hypothetical” in the 
hypothetical felony approach does not permit courts to make ex-post 
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determinations about what crimes an individual might have been charged 
with. Id. at *12–13. The court disagreed with the 5th and 7th Circuits 
primarily because the Supreme Court had already rejected the approach 
that courts may look back through a defendant’s record to determine 
what crime they could have been prosecuted for. Id. at *16. Thus the 
10th Circuit concluded that “the hypothetical federal felony approach 
permits us to examine only the state crime that was actually prosecuted.” 
Id. at *11. 
Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) – Violent Felony: United States 
v. Lee, 586 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2009) 
The 11th Circuit addressed whether a “non-violent walkaway 
escape is a violent felony for purposes of the [ACCA]” after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Chambers v. United States, __ U.S. __ , 129 S. Ct. 
687 (2009). Id. at 866. The 11th Circuit noted that prior to Chambers, all 
the circuits except the 9th Circuit “held that all escapes were crimes of 
violence and/or violent felonies.” Id. at 867. After Chambers, the 11th 
Circuit found that “several of [its] sister circuits ha[d] overruled their 
prior precedents and concluded that walkaway escapes [we]re no longer 
properly classifiable as violent felonies under the ACCA or crimes of 
violence under the Sentencing Guidelines,” specifically the 3rd, 6th, and 
7th Circuits. Id. at 869.  The 11th Circuit agreed with these circuits in 
finding a non-violent walkaway escape from unsecured custody is not 
sufficiently similar in kind or in degree of risk posed to the ACCA’s 
enumerated crimes to bring it within § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s residual 
provision. Id. at 874. 
Career Offender Designation – Reduction for Overrepresentation: 
United States v. Munn, 595 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2010) 
The 4th Circuit addressed “[w]hether § 3582(c)(2) authorizes a 
district court to grant a motion for a reduced sentence when the 
sentencing court designated the defendant as a career offender but then 
found that the career offender designation overrepresents his criminal 
history.” Id. at 187–88. The court noted that the 2nd and 11th Circuits 
had determined that “§ 3582(c)(2) and the accompanying Policy 
Statement require only that a defendant’s sentence be ‘based on’ a 
subsequently amended guideline range,” while the 8th Circuit found that 
the “designation of a defendant as a career offender precludes a sentence 
reduction under § 3582(c)(2).” Id. at 189–91. The 4th Circuit agreed with 
the 2nd and 11th Circuits in finding that “a defendant’s career offender 
designation does not bar a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction based on 
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Amendment 706 if (1) the sentencing court granted an 
Overrepresentation Departure from the career offender guideline range, 
and (2) the court relied on the Crack Guidelines in calculating the extent 
of the departure.” Id. at 192. The court disagreed with the 8th Circuit, 
stating, “the Sentencing Guidelines do not compel the conclusion that a 
sentencing court must determine a defendant’s applicable guideline range 
before granting an Overrepresentation Departure.” Id. (emphasis in 
original). Thus, the 4th Circuit concluded that “§ 3582(c)(2) authorizes a 
district court to grant a motion for a reduced sentence when the 
sentencing court designated the defendant as a career offender but then 
found that the career offender designation overrepresents his criminal 
history.” Id. at 188. 
Career Offender Designation – Robbery as Crime of Violence: United 
States v. Gregory, 591 F.3d 964 (7th Cir. 2010) 
The 7th Circuit addressed whether a defendant’s robbery conviction 
counted as a crime of violence, thus classifying the defendant as a career 
offender under the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 966. The court noted 
that “the [4th] Circuit has sided with [the defendant], while the 3rd, 9th, 
and 11th Circuits have taken the government’s position,” and that the 
“2nd Circuit has come close to the government’s position as well.” Id. at 
967. The court determined that “[t]he difference of opinion centers on the 
question whether, in addition to distinguishing between adult and 
juvenile convictions, the Guidelines also call for distinguishing between 
adult and juvenile sentences, depending on whether the sentence is 
imposed pursuant to the adult or juvenile criminal code.” Id. (emphasis 
in original). The 7th Circuit found that “[t]he 4th Circuit concluded that 
the Sentencing Commission did adopt the latter refinement. The word 
‘imprisonment,’ it said, applies only to adult convictions, whereas the 
word ‘confinement’ applies to both juvenile and adult dispositions.” Id. 
The 7th Circuit further noted that “[t]he remaining courts have not been 
persuaded by this line of argument.” Id. The 7th Circuit was not 
persuaded by the 4th Circuit’s approach, which found “it difficult to 
believe that the Commission would have made such an important point 
about juveniles convicted as adults using such subtle linguistic signals. 
Id. If the Commission had wanted to draw such a sharp distinction 
between juveniles with adult convictions sentenced as adults and those 
sentenced as juveniles, it would have done so more clearly.” Id. Thus, the 
7th Circuit concluded that “the critical question is whether the juvenile 
was convicted as an adult, not how he was sentenced.” Id. 
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Authority of the Federal Bureau of Prison – Early Release: Handley v. 
Chapman, 587 F.3d 273 (5th Cir. 2009) 
The 5th Circuit addressed whether the Federal Bureau of Prison 
(“BOP”) used reasonable exercise of its statutory authority in 
“implementing regulation that categorically excludes early-release 
eligibility for those inmates whose ‘current offense is a felony . . . [t]hat 
involved the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm.’” Id. at 276. The 
court noted that the 3rd and 8th Circuits found the exclusion of inmates 
who carried a firearm from early-release eligibility was a valid exercise 
of BOP authority, while the 9th, 10th and 11th Circuits did not. Id. at 
278. The 5th Circuit reasoned that under 18 U.S.C. 3621(e), “the [BOP] 
has the discretion to determine eligibility for early release consideration.” 
Id. at 279. Additionally, the court reasoned that in the interest of public 
safety, “[t]he [BOP] recognizes that there is a significant potential for 
violence from criminals who carry, possess or use firearms while 
engaged in felonious activity . . . [t]hus . . . these inmates should not be 
released months in advance of completing their sentences.” Id. at 280. 
Thus, the 5th Circuit concluded that due to the “public safety rationale,” 
the BOP used reasonable exercise of its statutory authority in excluding 
inmates who carried a firearm from early-release eligibility. Id. 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Sexual Offenders Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) – 
Offense Registration: United States v. Cain, 583 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 
2009) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether defendants convicted prior to the 
enactment of SORNA were required to comply with the terms of 
SORNA before the Attorney General issued an implementing regulation 
mandating retroactive adherence. Id. at 410. The court noted that of the 
five circuits to have addressed the issue, the 4th, 7th, and 10th Circuits 
have held that SORNA did not apply to certain offenders until the 
Attorney General specified its retroactive application. Id. at 415. The 6th 
Circuit, however, did not address the perspectives adopted by the other 
circuits, and instead, evaluated the issue utilizing the following factors: 
plain meaning of subsection 16913(d); the title of subsection 16913(d); 
the subsection’s relation to subsection 16901; textual ambiguity; and 
legislative history. Id. at 414–417. In doing so, the 6th Circuit agreed 
with the 4th, 7th, and 10th Circuits, concluding that “SORNA explicitly 
required the Attorney General to specify the applicability of the Act to 
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persons convicted prior to the effective date of SORNA.” Id. at 410. 
Accordingly, persons convicted prior to SORNA’s enactment were not 
required to comply with the terms of the Act prior to the Attorney 
General’s specific mandate. Id. 
